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I. INTRODUCTION 
If you know the enemy and know yourself, you 
need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you 
know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory 
gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know 
neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in 
every battle.1  
You might ask what an ancient text, written by a Chinese 
philosopher over 2,500 years ago, could possibly have to do with 
the topic of my essay, which concerns the rights of Native 
American artists to their creative works and the rights of tribal 
governments to protect tribal cultural art forms, such as quill work, 
bead work, and basketry. Indigenous artists and tribal communities 
are actively engaged in a fight to protect their cultures and art 
forms from appropriation and misuse. As Walter Echo-Hawk 
observes, there has been little legal protection for the cultural 
rights of Indigenous peoples, and consequently, “indigenous 
heritage has been appropriated, pirated and misused.”2 According 
to Echo-Hawk: 
The theft of culture is part of the one-way transfer 
of property from indigenous to non-indigenous 
hands seen in colonies and settler states around the 
world—it includes not only the taking of land, 
natural resources, personal property, but even the 
heritage of indigenous peoples and their very 
identities, plucking them as clean as a Safeway 
chicken.3 
Of course, many non-Indians fail to appreciate that Indigenous 
peoples hold a form of property right to aspects of their cultures, 
                                                   
1 SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR 18 (James Clavell ed. 1983). 
2 WALTER R. ECHO-HAWK, IN THE LIGHT OF JUSTICE: THE RISE OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN NATIVE AMERICA AND THE U.N. DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 198 (2013). 
3 Id. 
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namely the right to exclude others from particular uses or condition 
such use by requiring a license (for example, for the commercial 
use of the tribal name).4 The U.S. laws regulating intellectual 
property rights (copyright, patent, trademark) provide a poor fit for 
the interests of Indigenous nations in protecting the intangible 
aspects of their cultural heritage.5 There have been limited 
victories by federally recognized American Indian and Alaska 
Native nations seeking to prevent consumer confusion about what 
an “Indian product” is for purposes of the federal Indian Arts and 
Crafts Act,6 which protects the right of American Indian and 
Alaska Native artists to market their art as an authentic Indian 
product.7 However, the appropriation of tribal art forms continues, 
as design guru Ralph Lauren and commercial marketers such as 
J.C. Penney have demonstrated by transforming the intricate silver 
and turquoise jewelry of Southwest Indian tribes into mass-market 
products for trendy fashionistas trying to “play Indian.”8 If 
appropriately labeled to avoid consumer confusion, the non-Indian 
design world will continue to capture the greatest share of 
commercial value of tribal art forms, and most consumers and 
producers will overlook the impact on tribal cultural identity. 
 
Many, if not most, non-Indians fail to understand the 
significance of cultural identity to Indigenous peoples, nor do they 
                                                   
4 Angela R. Riley, "Straight Stealing": Towards an Indigenous System of 
Cultural Property Protection, 80 WASH. L. REV. 69, 71-72 (2005) (describing 
the use of Native American cultural practices in the entertainment industry 
without any social response to the appropriation of Native American culture.) 
5 Id. 
6 See Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-644, 104 Stat. 4662. 
7 See id. 
8 See John Hartman, Under Turquoise Skies – Ralph Lauren, DURANGO SILVER 
(Mar. 6, 2011), http://www.durangosilver.com/blog/tag/ralph-lauren-turquoise/; 
See Megan Finnerty, Stepping into a Cultural Conundrum, THE ARIZONA 
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understand the concept of cultural harm.9 Consequently, the battle 
over cultural appropriation continues as Dan Snyder, owner of the 
Washington team, proclaims that the “Redskins” logo and team 
name actually honors Indians, ignoring the protests of Native 
leaders and tribal members who assert that the mascot disparages 
and degrades them.10 The battle continues over sacred symbols as 
pop music giant Pharrell Williams and countless other celebrities 
wear garish “war bonnets”11 in a caricature of the ceremonial 
headdress that is culturally authorized for use only by esteemed 
and worthy tribal leaders from the Indigenous nations of the 
Southern and Northern Plains. But is this really a desecration or is 
it a permissible act of artistic appropriation? If there is no legal 
right to stop these appropriations, why should it matter? Perhaps 
most vexing of all, it seems to outsiders that not “all Indians” agree 
on the terms of the debate. Team owner Dan Snyder pointed this 
out as he hosted his VIP guests, then-Navajo Nation President Ben 
Shelly and First Lady Martha Shelly, during a 2014 football game 
in Glendale, Arizona, all wearing hats with the infamous 
Washington Team logo.12 
                                                   
9 See Rebecca Tsosie, Cultural Challenges to Biotechnology: Native American 
Genetic Resources and the Concept of Cultural Harm, 35 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 
396, 405–09 (2007) (articulating multiple examples of cultural harm against 
Indians by non-Indians due to their failure to recognize or understand the 
significance of cultural identity and the unique nature of Tribal claims). 
10 Daniel Snyder Defends Redskins, ESPN (Aug. 6, 2014), 
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/11313245/daniel-snyder-redskins-term-honor-
respect. This essay refers to that entity as “the Washington Team” in the text 
that follows. 
11 See ELLE (July 2014) (UK edition) (picturing Williams on the cover in a 
headdress); Shan Li, Victoria’s Secret Apologizes For Use of Native American 
Headdress, LA TIMES (Nov. 13, 2012), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/13/business/la-fi-victorias-secret-native-
american-20121113. 
12 See Andrew Joseph, Navajo Nation President Ben Shelly Sits in Box With Dan 
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If one reads Sun Tzu’s words carefully, it is abundantly clear 
that identity is of paramount importance in times of war, as in the 
context of a battle.13 One must know oneself and also one’s enemy. 
Similarly, one must differentiate the rules of governance that hold 
a civil society together, from the principles that govern a war 
between enemies. Sun Tzu also wrote that “[h]umanity and justice 
are the principles” by which states must govern their affairs.14 In 
comparison, “opportunism and flexibility” govern armies as they 
go to war with the enemy, and these are “military rather than civic 
virtues.”15 Are we in a time where just principles of governance 
will define the respective boundaries between Native rights and 
those who want to profit from Native culture? Or do the terms of 
the debate suggest that cultural production is yet another 
battleground between Native governments and the nation-states 
that now encompass them? 
This essay is intended to facilitate a dialogue about who 
possesses the authority to use tribal designs, symbols and motifs 
within the contemporary sphere of cultural production.16 I will 
explore why U.S. copyright and trademark law often do not 
adequately protect the interests of Native artists or tribal 
governments, and why tribal governments should be concerned 
about the international dialogue concerning ownership of 
traditional cultural expression. This essay builds on Walter Echo-
Hawk’s argument that securing adequate legal protection for the 
cultural rights of Native artists and tribal governments is pivotal to 
the realization of their human rights within domestic society.17 
Echo-Hawk’s argument embodies a complex array of issues, and 
this essay maps those issues for future discussion and analysis. In 
my view, Echo-Hawk appropriately describes the protection of 
Indigenous cultural rights as the most important issue for the future 
                                                   
13 See TZU, supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
14 Id. at 17. 
15 Id. 
16 Finnerty, supra note 8. 
17 ECHO-HAWK, supra note 2 at 198. 
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because if the law cannot intervene to protect Indigenous peoples 
from cultural harm, the final phase of colonialism will proceed 
unabated. I use the term “colonialism” to describe the power 
dynamics of European settlement on the lands that ultimately 
became the United States.18 That dynamic alternately engaged 
policies of war and peace with Native peoples, but always 
employed the use of power and dominance to subordinate Native 
peoples and appropriate land, resources, and rights from them. This 
was done to build the empire of the British Crown and then to 
build the new nation that emerged as the United States. 
Colonialism in the United States has proceeded through three 
phases. The first phase involved the destruction of Native peoples 
through outright military action from the date of European contact 
until the “Indian Wars” were deemed officially concluded in the 
United States at the close of the nineteenth century.19 The 
battleground was tangible and the cost of defeat was loss of life. 
There was no confusion over who was Indigenous and who was 
not. The conversation was about who was an ally and who was an 
enemy. During this first phase, the United States used its military 
power to subdue Indigenous Nations who were deemed to be the 
enemies of the United States, and the U.S. sought political 
alliances with Indigenous Nations who were willing to be its 
allies.20 There are over 500 treaties between American Indian 
Nations and the United States government, dating from 1778 until 
1871, when Congress ended making treaties with Indian nations.21 
Each of those documents acknowledges the sovereignty of the 
                                                   
18 See CAROLE GOLDBERG, REBECCA TSOSIE, KEVIN WASHBURN & ELIZABETH 
WASHBURN, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: NATIVE NATIONS AND THE FEDERAL 
SYSTEM 3 (6th ed. 2010) (describing Federal Indian law as “a doctrinal, 
historical vestige of the legal regime that tried to rationalize, legitimate, and 
regulate American colonialism over Indian tribes.”). 
19 See id., at 1–121 (recounting the history of Federal Indian law in great detail). 
20 Id. at 14–20. 
21 Id. at 4; Helen Oliff, Treaties Made, Treaties Broken, NAT’L RELIEF 
CHARITIES BLOG (March 3, 2011), http://blog.nrcprograms.org/treaties-made-
treaties-broken/. 
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Indian nations, as well as their rightful claims to their traditional 
lands and resources. Most of those treaties were subsequently 
breached,22 in whole or in part, due to the actions of the United 
States, as well as its failure to protect treaty-guaranteed lands from 
encroachment by settlers.23 Today, that brutal past exists in 
monuments that mark the sites of the massacres at Wounded Knee, 
Sand Creek, and other places where Native peoples experienced 
genocide as they fought to protect their homelands and peoples. Of 
course, the past also lives on in the memory of their descendants.  
The second phase of colonialism involved the appropriation of 
Native lands and cultural objects for use of Euro-American settlers 
in the guise of efforts to civilize Indians so that they could 
eventually be incorporated into society as American citizens. 
During this era, all Indians were treated alike, whether they had 
been friends or enemies of the United States during the prior 
interval. Federal civilization policy relied on the notion of a 
“wardship” under which the benevolent civilized government 
maintained virtually absolute control over the “savage” wards, who 
were deemed to lack the fundamental capacity to maintain rights to 
ownership of property or ability to contract for goods and services, 
as “civilized” peoples could. Until the late 1930s, the Indian Agent 
assigned to each reservation assumed direct control over tribal 
members on the reservation, and the Indian ward had no right to 
leave the reservation or enter the larger society, except with the 
approval of the Agent or his designees. The battleground became 
both tangible and intangible because control was exercised over 
the physical body and at the level of the mind to break down the 
freedom of Native peoples and their ability to maintain their 
historical and separate cultural and political identities. Federal law 
and policy converted the political relationship between Nations 
                                                   
22 Oliff, supra note 21. 
23 GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 18 at 15–16. 
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into a hierarchical relationship between the dependent ward and 
the benevolent master as “trustee.”24  
During this second era of colonialism, the United States 
government used its political power to appropriate vast amounts of 
Native land and tangible tribal cultural heritage, including sacred 
objects, objects of cultural patrimony, and human remains.25 At the 
same time, the U.S. government endeavored to erase tribal cultural 
identity through a mandatory civilization program that featured the 
federal boarding school policy; federally-supported efforts to 
convert Indians to Christianity; the federal allotment policy, which 
was designed to break down tribal landholdings and inculcate an 
individual ethic of property ownership, as well as other nineteenth 
and twentieth century equivalents. Policymakers touted the 
civilization program as being “beneficial” to Indians because it 
would prepare them for a future in which they might transcend the 
limitations of their status as wards and become U.S. citizens.26 
Initially, Congress selectively naturalized American Indians to 
citizenship if they demonstrated successful assimilation.27 In 1924, 
Congress enacted the Indian Citizenship Act, which extended U.S. 
citizenship to all American Indians, but specified that they would 
retain their treaty rights and political rights under federal law, as 
members of federally recognized tribal governments.28  
Indigenous peoples survived the first two waves of colonialism 
and today, federally recognized tribal governments exist as 
                                                   
24 Rebecca Tsosie, Reclaiming Native Stories: An Essay on Cultural 
Appropriation and Cultural Rights, 34 ARIZ. STATE L.J. 299, 317-332 (2002) 
(describing the relationship between historical policies and the use of native 
images by outsiders.). 
25 See generally Rebecca Tsosie, Who Controls Native Cultural Heritage? 
“Art,” “Artifacts,” and the Right to Cultural Survival, CULTURAL HERITAGE 
ISSUES: THE LEGACY OF CONQUEST, COLONIZATION, AND COMMERCE (2009); 
see also Tsosie, Reclaiming Native Stories, supra note 24, at 317-332. 
26 See Tsosie, Reclaiming Native Stories, supra note 24 at 317–332. 
27 GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 18, at 30. 
28 Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (1924) (codified at 8 
U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2012)). 
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separate nations, with recognized legal rights of self-governance 
and the moral and political right to self-determination.29 Tribal 
governments possess executive, legislative, and judicial powers, 
and they exercise jurisdiction over their lands and their members.30 
American Indian and Alaska Native peoples are members of their 
tribal Nations, as well as full citizens of the United States and the 
states where they reside. They are free to practice the religion of 
their choice, can attend public or private schools, and may reside 
on or off the reservation. Some would say that we are no longer in 
an era of colonialism because citizenship guarantees the same 
autonomy of choice that all members of U.S. civil society possess. 
However, I argue that we are currently in a third and perhaps final 
phase of colonialism, which is quite insidious because it operates 
at the level of consciousness. We all possess beliefs that are deeply 
programmed into our subconscious minds and these beliefs inform 
our actions and our beliefs about what is “possible.” As collectives 
and as individuals, who do we think that “we” are and who do we 
think that “they” are? Have “we” become “them”? Do we mirror 
who “they” think that “we” are? Clearly, identity matters. But who 
decides the rules? And as we address the issue of Indigenous 
cultural rights, do we operate by the principles of just governance 
in a civil society? Or do we operate by the principles of war? 
These are complex questions and they merit sustained 
attention. This essay will frame the components of the debate as a 
way to expand the dialogue about the rights of Native artists and 
the role of Indigenous rights in “cultural production,” which is a 
process that involves many different dynamics, including social 
media, the entertainment industry, the art industry, the 
marketplace, the laws that govern the rights of “individuals” to 
their creations (intellectual property law), and the laws that govern 
the rights of tribal governments to their cultures (Federal Indian 
                                                   
29 GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 18 at 13–39, 111–12. 
30 See generally GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 18, at 382-94 (discussing tribal 
governmental structures and functions in the modern era); 1–18 COHEN’S 
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 4.04 (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2012). 
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law). In discussing “American” cultural production, I will build on 
an insight made by Kevin Gover, Director of the National Museum 
of the American Indian, at a recent lecture given at Arizona State 
University.31 Gover discussed an upcoming exhibit at the National 
Museum of the American Indian (NMAI) entitled “Americans,” 
noting that until the 1700s, the term was used exclusively to 
reference Indigenous peoples in the Americas. However, over 
time, the term “Americans” has become synonymous with the 
people of the United States. The United States was birthed from 
British colonies and presumably built upon a British cultural 
tradition. This is clearly illustrated by our categories of law and 
philosophy, which continue to inform the discussion about rights 
and what is a legal issue, versus a moral issue. However, the 
United States has constructed itself as a multicultural democracy 
through a mode of cultural production that draws heavily upon its 
“Indigenous” heritage. Does the cultural heritage of Indigenous 
peoples belong to the United States? Or is this appropriation of 
Indigenous cultural identity the final act of colonialism in a 
centuries-long struggle to claim victory over the Indigenous 
Nations of this land?  
That question is of increasing importance since technology can 
enhance our capacity to generate creative expression, but it can 
also further confuse cultural identity. This essay highlights the 
contemporary policy issues and argues for Indigenous nations to 
develop their own governance systems for “traditional cultural 
expression,” which is the term used by nation-states to describe a 
default category of cultural heritage that contains anything that is 
not formally protected under existing intellectual property laws.32 
                                                   
31 Kevin Gover, Dir., Nat’l Museum of the Am. Indian, Lecture at the Sandra 
Day O’Connor College of Law Indigenous Stereotypes in Sports Symposium 
(Jan. 30, 2015). 
32 In 2013, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) sought 
comment on a draft Treaty dealing with the Protection of Traditional Cultural 
Expression. In that draft, Traditional Cultural Expression is defined as “any 
form of artistic and literary expression, tangible and/or intangible, or a 
combination thereof, . . . in which traditional culture and knowledge are 
12
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In addition, individual Native artists should be active participants 
in the dialogue about the relationship between art and cultural 
identity and what falls within the category of permissible cultural 
production, as a system of voluntary and appropriate cultural 
sharing and exchange. This must be contrasted with what falls 
within the category of cultural misappropriation, meaning the 
involuntary and exploitive transfer of value and benefit from the 
Indigenous group to the dominant producers and consumers of the 
global arts economy.33 Currently, public policy is unable to 
differentiate the permissible use of Indigenous cultural expression 
from its misuse, and Indigenous peoples are the only ones who can 
speak to this.34 I will argue that the rules of civil society should 
govern this debate in a spirit of just and respectful intercultural 
exchange between Indigenous peoples and the various national and 
global governance systems. However, if this is not possible, we 
should at least understand the rules of the war that we are engaged 
in, and we should acknowledge the battlegrounds that exist at the 
level of consciousness and in the material world that drives our 
economic system.  
In the text that follows, I will sketch my ideas in a 
chronological form, so that the reader can understand the 
relationship of Indigenous cultural identity to the rights of cultural 
                                                                                                                  
embodied . . . [and] which is intergenerational, . . . including, but not limited to 
phonetic and verbal expressions, musical and sound expressions, expressions by 
action, tangible expressions, and adaptations of these expressions.” The notes to 
the text clarify that the category encompasses stories, epics, legends, poetry, 
narratives, songs, rituals, dance, plays, ceremonies, and games, as well as 
“material expressions of art, handicrafts, ceremonial masks or dress, handmade 
carpets, architecture and sacred places.” Intergovernmental Committee on 
Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and 
Folklore, The Protection of Traditional Cultural Expressions: Draft Articles, 




33 Finnerty, supra note 8 (distinguishing the two sets of cases). 
34 Id. 
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production in the modern era. Part II of the paper discusses the 
context for the debate by examining the historical and modern 
context of cultural imagery, as it has affected Native peoples. Part 
III discusses identity harms and the role of tribal governments in 
regulating the protection of Native culture under existing domestic 
law. Part IV of the paper focuses on the rights of Native artists to 
their creations and the principles that U.S. law invokes for 
determining rights claims. In Part V, the paper discusses the 
broader implications of these issues for Indigenous peoples, 
focusing on international human rights law as a tool to define 
Indigenous governance over cultural identity. 
II. COLONIALISM, CULTURAL IMAGERY,  
AND NATIVE PEOPLES 
As Professor Robert Williams notes in his brilliant critique of 
Western civilization, Savage Anxieties, Western European peoples 
have, for centuries, employed the cultural imagery of the “savage” 
to divest other peoples (including Indigenous peoples) of their 
rights and to reinvent their own governments and societies in the 
process.35 Williams argues that “without the idea of the savage to 
understand what it is, what is was, and what it could be, Western 
civilization, as we know it, would never have been able to invent 
itself.”36 In particular, Western philosophers and jurists relied on 
the notion of an “irreconcilable difference between civilization and 
savagery” to shape and direct the nature of the policies that would 
govern their interaction with these peoples.37   
Building on his prior work, Williams demonstrates how the 
cultural imagery of the “savage” justified the Doctrine of 
Discovery, under which Western European nations appropriated 
lands in the Americas for their “ownership” and control during the 
colonial era; the same cultural imagery was invoked to birth a new 
                                                   
35 ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., SAVAGE ANXIETIES: THE INVENTION OF WESTERN 
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nation, the United States, and to justify its claims for land 
acquisition during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.38 
Today, Williams claims, this dynamic reprises in stereotypes of 
Native peoples and legal justifications for policies that would 
otherwise reflect an illegitimate form of racism under 
contemporary law.39 Native stereotypes continue while the overt 
caricatures of Black, Latino, and Asian peoples have disappeared 
from the contemporary marketplace.40 Thus, in the twenty-first 
century, the Western world’s “most advanced nation-states 
continue to perpetuate the stereotypes and clichéd images of 
human savagery that were first invented by the ancient Greeks to 
justify their ongoing violations of the most basic human rights of 
cultural survival belonging to indigenous tribal peoples.”41  
Williams identifies these doctrines as the most dangerous threat 
to the continuing survival of the world’s indigenous peoples 
because it normalizes the hierarchical and exploitive relationship 
created by colonialism.42 As Williams and Echo-Hawk point out, 
the failure to recognize adequate legal rights to tribal cultural 
                                                   
38 See id. at 224–25. The Doctrine of Discovery was first applied under 
international law to vacant lands in order to validate the ownership of the first 
Nation to discover such lands. However, it was then extended during the era of 
European colonialism to validate the claims of civilized Christian nations to 
colonize areas inhabited by uncivilized and non-Christian peoples (heathens and 
infidels in India and the Middle East, as well as Native peoples throughout the 
Americas). Chief Justice John Marshall imported the Doctrine of Discovery into 
Federal Indian law in the famous case of Johnson v. McIntosh, which held that 
Great Britain and its successor, the United States, retained the fee interest in the 
lands that they discovered and settled, except for the “right of occupancy” 
(aboriginal title), which allowed Native people to remain in possession of their 
lands until their title of occupancy was extinguished by the European sovereign 
by purchase or conquest. See 21 U.S. 543 (1823). The Doctrine of Discovery 
thus established a hierarchy of authority that subordinated Indigenous 
governance systems. 
39 WILLIAMS, supra note 35, at 225. 
40 See Marty Westerman, Death of the Frito Bandito, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS Mar. 
1989, at 28. 
41 Id. at 9. 
42 Id. 
15
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protection constitutes a compelling human rights problem in this 
country. This battle is intangible, and therefore it remains unseen 
and unacknowledged by most citizens in contemporary society, 
even by some of those who are Indigenous. The battle involves 
identity, power, and the right to claim the essence of an Indigenous 
people as belonging to the European-derived nations that claim 
rights through discovery. This mode of engagement served the 
European nations as they appropriated Native lands, through the 
concept of the “public domain,” and it continues to serve 
descendants of European nations today as they appropriate Native 
identities.43 
There is clearly an element of racism at work, given the 
cultural imagery of the savage. However, Federal Indian law neatly 
sidesteps the issue of racism by affirming that federally-recognized 
American Indian and Alaska Native governments are political, 
rather than racial, groups, and that their rights are governed by the 
unique rules of Federal Indian law, as opposed to the rules that 
govern equality of citizenship for members of racial minorities. 
With limited exceptions, contemporary U.S. civil rights law 
disclaims the need to treat citizens differently based upon their 
status as members of “racial or ethnic minority groups.”44 Today, 
all laws that create race-based classifications, whether beneficial 
(i.e., affirmative action) or harmful, are evaluated under strict 
scrutiny for purposes of the equal protection clause.45 In 
comparison, the United States routinely passes special legislation 
                                                   
43 See statement by Professor James Anaya, Special Rapporteur on the rights of 
Indigenous peoples, twenty-third session of the World Intellectual Property 
Organization, Intergovernmental Commission, Feb. 4, 2013, at 3 (comparing 
notion of the public domain with the Terra Nullius doctrine) [hereinafter 
Professor Anaya statement]. 
44 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 300u-6, 2000e-16 (2012) (government employment is 
free from discrimination on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin”). 
45 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (holding that all 
racial classifications authorized by any governmental actor must be analyzed by 
the reviewing court under strict scrutiny). 
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to secure the political rights of the Native Nations that are in a trust 
relationship with the United States.46 These laws are treated very 
deferentially, applying only the minimal level of review to 
determine whether they are rationally related to the government’s 
trust responsibility.47 
Today, tribal attorneys build on the Federal Indian law 
framework to argue for Indigenous cultural rights under the 
guidance of the political right to self-determination. As Professor 
James Anaya points out, the norm of self-determination 
encompasses a right to cultural integrity for Indigenous peoples.48 
The self-determination argument works well with tangible 
resources such as land and cultural patrimony. It is less successful 
as applied to intangible resources because the relationship of 
Native culture to self-determination is much more nuanced and 
complex. This is due to the historical legacy of cultural imagery 
that was employed to divest Indigenous peoples of their rights to 
land and cultural identity, as well as the modern trend to normalize 
“cultural borrowing” as a means to contemporary cultural 
production.49 After 500 years of contact, the line between 
European and Indigenous culture is blurred and any attempt to 
fence out an intrusion or appropriation meets resistance unless it 
falls within a classic case of copyright or trademark violation. 
Furthermore, in the case of stereotyping, it is not always 
obvious that the political status of tribal governments can insulate 
them from the multiple harms that stereotyping causes to tribal 
                                                   
46 Title 25 of the U.S. Code is devoted to the rights of tribal governments. See 25 
U.S.C. §§ 1–44 (2012). 
47 See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974) (“As long as the 
special treatment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique 
obligation toward the Indians, such legislative judgments will not be 
disturbed.”). 
48 S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 111 (2d ed. 
2004). 
49 See Christine Hoff Kraemer, Cultural Borrowing/Cultural Appropriation: A 
Relationship Model For Respectful Borrowing, 2 THORN MAG. 36 (2009). 
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identity, and individually to tribal members.50 Indeed, as 
philosopher Miranda Fricker points out, our basic social 
interactions tend to have profound impacts upon particular groups, 
and epistemic injustice can arise when individuals are harmed in 
their ability to convey knowledge to others or to make sense of 
their own experience.51 In such cases, the “politics of epistemic 
practice” determine how social power operates to produce injustice 
in everyday social practices. A group can be harmed in its ability 
to participate equally in creating a given social experience, 
including defining what constitutes art.52 Is art the individual 
creation of an artist? Does it comprise the tribe’s own form of 
culturally authorized cultural production; through songs, designs, 
ceremonies, symbols, and the like? According to Fricker, when a 
group is excluded from exerting power within an institution, such 
as legislative or judicial bodies, which controls the terms of their 
own experience, injustice arises.53 Similarly, when individuals who 
object to the dominant system are targeted as militants or not 
representative of the group itself, they suffer a further injustice that 
impairs their ability to convey valid or relevant information 
because they have been labeled as unreliable or not meriting 
credibility. Indigenous peoples have been affected by epistemic 
injustice in many categories of public policy and these dynamics 
exist in the current debates over Native control over culture and 
art.54 
The next section will discuss the impact of stereotyping as a 
form of identity harm, arguing that certain forms of cultural 
                                                   
50 E.g., CNN Wire Staff, Native Americans Object to Linking Geronimo to bin 
Laden, CNN (May 6, 2011, 5:55 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2011/US/05/05/bin.laden.geronimo/index.html. 
51 See MIRANDA FRICKER, EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE: POWER AND THE ETHICS OF 
KNOWING 1 (2007). 
52 Id. at 153–54. 
53 Id. 
54 See generally Rebecca Tsosie, Indigenous Peoples and Epistemic Injustice: 
Science, Ethics, and Human Rights, 87 WASH. L. REV. 1133 (2012). 
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production are employed to negate the ability of tribal 
governments to control intangible aspects of cultural heritage. 
III. NATIONAL IDENTITY, TRIBAL IDENTITY,  
AND IDENTITY HARM 
The law is a social institution that broadly involves power 
relations between the national government and its citizens, and 
between the United States and Native Nations. In the former case, 
the government and its citizens share a political identity within 
civil society, although pluralistic democracies must manage 
diverse cultural identities. Modern pluralistic democracies, such as 
the United States, tend to do this under the project of 
“multiculturalism,” which Professor Steven Vertovec describes as 
a diversity management strategy that promotes “tolerance and 
respect for collective identities” associated with specific cultural 
groups.55 This requires an overall understanding of the dominant 
identity of the national government, as well as the careful 
management of racial and ethnic minorities to ensure that they 
enjoy equal citizenship, meaning equal access to political and civil 
rights. Notably, under this model, religion and other forms of 
cultural differences are tolerated and accommodated to the extent 
possible, consistent with other national objectives.56 However, 
there is no right to culture within the United States, and therefore, 
attributes of minority cultures, such as language and other cultural 
practices, are not affirmatively protected or preserved, unless they 
are part of the national culture, such as designated historic sites.57 
The question of what belongs within the dominant cultural 
identity of the national government, and what belongs within the 
minority group’s cultural identity, may be clear in Great Britain 
and other European countries. However, it is a difficult question in 
                                                   
55 See Steven Vertovec, Super-Diversity and Its Implications, 30 ETHNIC & 
RACIAL STUD. 1024, 1027, 1047 (2007). 
56 Id. at 1027. 
57 See Tsosie, Reclaiming Native Stories, supra note 24 at 332-46 (identifying 
the arguments for and against legal protection for a “right to culture”). 
19
Tsosie: Just Governance or Just War?: Native Artists, Cultural Production
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2015
[6:2 2015]        CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 74 
 LAW REVIEW       
 
settler nations, such as the United States, Canada, and New 
Zealand, at least in relation to Indigenous peoples. In the quest for 
a separate national identity, the United States, like many other 
settler countries, appropriated Indigenous land and cultural 
imagery as a way to establish its own identity separately from its 
British forebears. This is clearly demonstrated by the role of the 
museum in settler states, such as Canada, the United States, New 
Zealand, and Australia, which focused on “creating a common 
identity for the new nation, pluralistic in nature, descended from 
Europe, but located on new lands separated from Europe.”58 
Throughout its history, the United States has appropriated 
Indigenous names and symbols to build federal power, including 
use of Native images and identities on U.S. currency, and military 
operations and equipment (e.g. the Apache helicopter, “Operation 
Geronimo”).59 Similarly, the United States has built a national 
creation mythology around the encounter of Europeans with 
Indians (e.g. Pocahontas and John Rolfe, Sacajawea and Lewis and 
Clark).60 Even if the images portray Native people positively, they 
are invoked to build the country’s national identity.  
Conversely, the negative stereotypes of the Indian as a 
“savage” that Professor Williams discusses were used to justify 
federal paternalism to take Indian land, children, religions, and 
cultural objects for the “good of the Indians” in the nineteenth 
century.61 Although modern policymakers disclaim any continuing 
intent to invoke cultural racism, stereotypes about Native peoples 
persists in American culture, politics, and sports, thus perpetuating 
the historical consciousness about Native identity within 
                                                   
58 Rebecca Tsosie, Native Nations and Museums: Developing an Institutional 
Framework for Cultural Sovereignty, 45 U. TULSA L. REV. 3, 6 (2000). 
59 ‘Geronimo’: Native Americans Blast Bin Laden Code Name, 
NBCNEWS.COM, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/42897871/ns/world_news-
death_of_bin_laden/t/geronimo-native-americans-blast-bin-laden-code-
name/#.VVMIWkaGNqw (last updated May 4, 2011). 
60 Gover, supra note 31. 
61 See Rebecca Tsosie, Cultural Challenges to Biotechnology, supra note 9 at 
403. 
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contemporary society. It is important to note that this national 
consciousness undermines the ability of Indigenous peoples to 
participate as equals in the construction of their contemporary 
identities, labeling such exercises as mere efforts to establish what 
is politically correct. In this world, the “good” Indian still passively 
relies on the non-Indian benefactor to create value for tribal 
existence, as demonstrated by Dan Snyder’s attempt to gain the 
support of nationally recognized tribal leaders and organizations 
for the Washington Team’s mascot. The “bad” Indians who 
demonstrate and voice opposition are dismissed as troublemakers 
and malcontents, as were the nineteenth century Indigenous patriot 
leaders, such as Sitting Bull, Crazy Horse, and Geronimo. The end 
result is that the United States government maintains the power to 
use Native identities for its purposes without being accountable for 
the harms to Native peoples. In fact, the use of cultural imagery is 
often protected as freedom of expression for purposes of the U.S. 
Constitution.62 
Clearly, American Indian and Alaska Native peoples have been 
affected by stereotypes throughout history. For purposes of this 
essay, it is necessary to examine who controls the image of the 
“Indian” in contemporary society. Are cultural images and 
identities considered property, in the sense that they can be owned 
and commercialized? Or are these images merely ideas that are 
beyond government regulation and are available for appropriation 
by others? 
A. Stereotyping and Identity Harm 
Stereotyping is a primary source of prejudice in which a biased 
attitude can manifest in legally prohibited behavior, such as 
discrimination, but is not, itself, actionable.63 For this reason, the 
case against stereotyping is best made by identifying its function. 
                                                   
62 Rebecca Tsosie, Reclaiming Native Stories: An Essay on Cultural 
Appropriation and Cultural Rights, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 299, 347-49 (2002). 
63 Kerri Lynn Stone, Clarifying Stereotyping, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 591 (2011) 
(discussing how stereotyping becomes actionable as discrimination). 
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Miranda Fricker describes stereotypes as “widely held associations 
between a given social group and one or more attributes.”64 Fricker 
asserts that stereotyping is one of the primary ways in which 
members of a society make “credibility judgments” about other 
members, to include them, privilege them, or exclude them from a 
given social practice.65 In this way, stereotyping is linked to other 
forms of injustice and can serve as a means of invoking identity 
power. 
Identity power is of particular importance because many social 
interactions depend upon the participants’ mutual understanding of 
their social power.66 Feminist scholars, for example, point out that 
men can use their male identity to influence a woman, perhaps by 
patronizing or intimidating her.67  These subtle forms of 
domination, sometimes framed as “microaggressions,” are not 
actionable under the law as gender discrimination, and yet, they 
may have a very harmful impact upon women’s rights to equality 
under the law.68 Similarly, tribal governments should care deeply 
about forms of cultural imagery that are used to portray Native 
peoples, because those stereotypes link up to a variety of harms, 
                                                   
64 FRICKER, supra note 51, at 30. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 14 (“Whenever there is an oprtaion of power that depends in some 
significant degree upon…shared imaginative conceptions of social identify, then 
identity power is at work.”) 
67 Tsosie, Indigenous Peoples and Epistemic Injustice, supra note 54, at 1154 
(citing id. at 17). 
68 Robin Lukes & Joann Bangs, A Critical Analysis of Anti-Discrimination Law 
and Microagressions in Academia, 24 RES. HIGHER EDUC. J. 1, 3 (2014) (“By 
their very nature, many microaggressions are not legally prohibited, because 
they are ‘everyday verbal, nonverbal, and environmental slights, snubs, or 
insults.’” (quoting DERALD WING SUE, MICROAGGRESSIONS IN EVERYDAY LIFE: 
RACE, GENDER, AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION 7 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2010)), 
available at http://www.aabri.com/manuscripts/141824.pdf); see Derald Wing 
Sue, Microaggressions: More than Just Race, MICROAGGRESSIONS IN 
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including economic exploitation, or, in the case of Native women, 
interpersonal violence. 69 
As Professor Anita Bernstein demonstrates in her article 
What’s Wrong With Stereotyping?, contemporary stereotyping 
represents a struggle between liberty and equality.70 Those who 
maintain that they have a constitutionally protected right to engage 
in symbolic speech, such as the use of mascots and other forms of 
negative cultural imagery about other groups, are asserting a 
degree of liberty that has adverse consequences for other groups, 
such as racial minorities and women. Stereotyping adversely 
affects those groups by constraining their opportunities, but the law 
does not acknowledge this harm. Instead, proponents of liberty 
often point out that all groups stereotype each other (Republicans 
and Democrats, Yankees and Southerners, Texans and New 
Yorkers, French and English, Catholics and Protestants) because 
all groups have a “type” (a set of characteristics and mannerisms) 
which is invoked, often humorously (e.g. the “redneck”) to poke 
fun at one’s own group or others. In other words, this is just what 
people do. What is the harm?  
Bernstein responds by noting that if groups operate on an equal 
basis of power in their social interactions, stereotyping is not 
harmful and it quite frequently is humorous.71 However, she points 
out that there are several stereotypes that we should care about 
because they affect vulnerable groups and perpetuate harm by 
painting the vulnerable group as stupid, crazy, irrational, violent, 
predatory, brutish, or subhuman.72 In these cases, there is a 
historical pattern to the use of stereotypes that identify traits 
associated with the group that (1) denigrates the group, (2) 
substantiates the dominant consciousness that the trait is actually 
                                                   
69 Shan Li, supra note 11 (cultural imagery sexualizes native women and 
promotes sexual violence). 
70 See Anita Bernstein, What's Wrong with Stereotyping?, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 655 
(2013). 
71 Id. at 664. 
72 Id. at 665. 
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true, and therefore (3) justifies a negative assertion of social power 
to control the group.73 This dynamic was also invoked by the 
Framers of the Constitution to justify the assertion that African 
peoples, who were imported into the United States to serve as 
slaves, should be counted as three fifths of a person74 while white 
persons were counted as full persons. This diminished status was 
justified by the view, expressed most overtly in the infamous Dred 
Scott case, that Africans, as a race, possessed a set of inferior traits 
that made enslavement the best destiny for them.75 Justice Taney 
wrote that Africans had, for more than a century, been “regarded as 
beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with 
the white race.”76 He found that they had been regarded as having 
“no rights which the white man was bound to respect; and that the 
Negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his 
benefit.”77  
Even after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, this form 
of dehumanizing imagery justified the social subordination of 
African American people under the distorted logic of Plessy v. 
Ferguson, which described racism as a social problem, rather than 
a legal problem, thereby justifying official government policies of 
segregation as a permissible form of social management.78 The 
separate-but-equal doctrine established by Plessy79 was ultimately 
overruled in the realm of K-12 public school education by the 1954 
                                                   
73 Id. at 720. 
74 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
75 See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), superseded by 
constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
76 Id. at 407. 
77 Id. 
78 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of 
Topeka, Shawnee County, Kan., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
79 Id. at 551, 561 (upholding Louisiana law segregating public transportation by 
restricting railway carriages for “white” and “colored” citizens on the theory that 
“separate but equal accommodations” regulate social norms and are therefore 
consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment’s call for political equality). 
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Supreme Court case of Brown v. Board of Education,80 followed 
by the more comprehensive reforms of the Civil Rights Act of 
196481 and subsequent civil rights legislation. However, racial 
equality remains elusive in the United States. Today, our society 
espouses “formal equality,” meaning that we resist most overt 
racial classifications. Yet, implicit racial biases are deeply 
embedded, and today the negative assertion of power can manifest 
as prejudice, which is generally not actionable because it is a 
private state of mind, or as discrimination, which is actionable if it 
violates a civil rights statute, for example, a landlord’s refusal to 
rent property based on the tenant’s racial status.  
Within contemporary society, the overt racism of the past has 
evolved into covert racism, a shadow form of disparate treatment 
that remains unseen by many members of society.82 These negative 
assertions of power can be masked as “neutral” policies (e.g., 
sentencing laws that have disparate impacts upon racial groups), 
and can also undergird racial profiling and disparate use of force to 
subdue African American “suspects,” most recently demonstrated 
by the recent events in Ferguson, Missouri.83 Months after the fatal 
shooting of Michael Brown, an eighteen-year-old black man, by 
                                                   
80 Brown, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) supplemented sub nom. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of 
Topeka, Kan., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (holding that racially segregated public 
schools are “inherently unequal” because they deny equal educational 
opportunity to children and impede their development as citizens in a 
democratic society). 
81 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). 
82 See William Y. Chin, The Age of Covert Racism in the Era of the Roberts 
Court During the Waning of Affirmative Action, 16 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 1, 
1–2 (2015). 
83 James B. Comey, Dir., Fed. Bureau Investigation, Address at Georgetown 
University (Feb. 12, 2015) (presenting on the role of implicit bias in criminal 
justice system), available at http://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/hard-truths-law-
enforcement-and-race; see also Kevin Johnson & Yamiche Alcindor, DOJ: 
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Officer Darren Wilson, a white law enforcement officer, the U.S. 
Department of Justice released a report demonstrating that the 
Ferguson Police Department engaged in “a broad pattern of 
racially biased enforcement . . . including the use of unreasonable 
force against African American suspects.”84 Specifically, the report 
documents that 88% of the cases involving use of force in 
Ferguson concerned African American suspects.85 The statistics 
may speak for themselves, but they also align with a history of 
cultural imagery depicting African American males as violent and 
given to criminal behavior, which has consistently resulted in a 
violation of the human rights and civil rights of African American 
people. 
B. Native American Mascots and Identity Harm 
Similarly, the use of cultural imagery as a mechanism to 
subordinate the rights of Native American peoples has been 
operative throughout history. Professor Williams’ work highlights 
the impact of the construction of Indigenous peoples as 
“savages.”86 The contemporary use of Indian images as sports 
mascots illustrates the continuing nature of the problem. The use of 
these images originated at a time in American history when overt 
racism and bigotry was the norm in American society.87 However, 
today these images are worth millions of dollars as a property 
interest in the hands of sports franchises such as the Washington 
Team, the Kansas City Chiefs, the Cleveland Indians, the Atlanta 
Braves, and the Chicago Blackhawks.88 Because the use of Native 
American cultural imagery has been normalized within American 
society, generations of Americans have grown up with their own 
                                                   
84 Johnson & Alcindor, supra note 83. 
85 Id. 
86 WILLIAMS, supra note 35, at 1. 
87 See NAT’L CONGRESS OF AM. INDIANS, ENDING THE LEGACY OF RACISM IN 
SPORTS AND THE ERA OF HARMFUL “INDIAN” SPORTS MASCOTS 2 (October 2013) 
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ideas about what they ought to be able to do, which includes the 
use of Indian mascots, even though they would no longer be 
willing to use overt cultural imagery to mock African Americans, 
Latinos, or Asians.89 Although two-thirds of Indian sports images 
and mascots have been eliminated from use during the past thirty-
five years, following a course of activism by Native peoples and 
support by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, as well as a host 
of other professional organizations and associations, there are still 
over 1,000 Indian sports images in active use, and the Washington 
Team continues to litigate its right to trademark the “Redskins” 
team name and image.90 
What accounts for the disparity between the treatment of these 
other groups and Native Americans? African Americans, Latinos, 
and Asians constitute much larger groups within U.S. society, 
wielding significant economic and political clout, while Native 
Americans continue to represent less than 2% of the U.S. 
population.91 But, the fact that the team owners continue to profit 
from the use of Native American images as sports mascots means 
that it is palatable to most Americans to consider these images to 
be the property of non-Native people. Native images have 
economic value to American society, demonstrating that the third 
phase of colonialism is actively in progress. In addition, the use of 
these images aligns with the intuition of Americans that cultural 
imagery is a form of constitutionally protected expression 
(symbolic speech)92 that merits protection as a liberty interest. And 
                                                   
89 The “Frito Bandito” and “Little Black Sambo,” for example, disappeared from 
commercial use during the 1970s. Frito Bandito, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frito_Bandito (last visited Apr. 7, 2015); Marty, 
Westerman, Death of the Frito Bandito, AMERICAN DEMOGRAPHICS (Mar. 
1989); Marjorie Rosenthal, Banned From American Bookshelves: The Story Of 
Little Black Sambo, LONG ISLAND BOOK COLLECTORS (Aug. 11, 2013), 
http://longislandbookcollectors.com/2013/%EF%BB%BFbanned-from-
american-bookshelves-the-story-of-little-black-sambo.  
90 NCAI REPORT, supra note 87, at 6, 10–15. 
91 Id. at 5. 
92 Examples of protected symbolic speech can be found in Virginia v. Black, 538 
U.S. 343 (2003) (cross burning), United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) 
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finally, the use of Native American cultural imagery is not cast as 
racism, but as a way to “honor” the Native American people. In 
other words, Americans have created themselves, through the use 
of Native American cultural imagery, a continuation of the 
dynamic that Williams describes in relation to the mythology of 
the “savage” as means to construct Western civilization. 
Within the third phase of colonialism, the commercial value of 
“Indian identity” belongs to non-Indians. This is being litigated 
right now in federal court, following a recent ruling by the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office Trademark Trial and Appeal Board 
in Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc., which cancelled six active 
trademark registrations for the “Redskins” on the grounds that this 
symbol disparages Native American people within the meaning of 
the federal Trademark laws.93 This ruling is currently being 
challenged by the Washington Team in a federal district court 
lawsuit that seeks to protect the right of the team to profit from the 
name.94 If the Native American petitioners prevail, the use of the 
term “Redskins” will lack Trademark protection, meaning that Pro-
Football, Inc. will have no federally protected property interest in 
the team name. This ruling, of course, does not affect the ability of 
individuals or corporations to use the term in other ways that 
would be offensive to Native American people. 
For example, several years ago, the Hornell Brewing Company 
used the name of a revered nineteenth century Lakota leader, 
                                                                                                                  
(flag burning), and United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (burning a 
draft card), among others. 
93 Blackhorse v. Pro-Football Inc., 111 U.S.P.Q.2d 1080 (T.T.A.B. 2014); see 
also Zoe Tillman, Judge Rules Redskins Trademark Case Can Move Forward, 
LEGALTIMES (Nov. 25, 2014 12:09 P.M.), 
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/legaltimes/id=1202677398589/Judge-Rules-
Redskins-Trademark-Defense-Can-Move-Forward?slreturn=20150228133911 
(discussing ruling of U.S. District Court Judge Gerald Bruce Lee which denied 
motion of Native American petitioners to dismiss the appeal, finding that Pro-
Football has a significant economic interest in the Trademarks which justifies 
appeal). 
94 Tillman, supra note 93. 
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Crazy Horse, to market a Malt Liquor product: “Crazy Horse Malt 
Liquor.”95 At the request of outraged tribal leaders, Congress held 
hearings on the matter and concluded that the name should be 
cancelled because the company was intentionally marketing the 
product to Native youth and creating further social problems for 
these impoverished communities with high rates of alcoholism, 
traffic related fatalities, and youth suicides.96 The federal court 
disagreed, holding that the company’s use of the name was 
constitutionally protected commercial speech, and that the 
government had impermissibly acted by banning the speech.97 
When the descendants of Crazy Horse attempted to sue Hornell 
Brewing Company in tribal court for a cultural tort, based upon 
defamation of their ancestor’s spirit and the family by 
unauthorized use of the leader’s name to market liquor, the federal 
courts held that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction over the Hornell 
Brewing Company, which was not doing business on the 
reservation.98 
The above cases demonstrate that harms to a name or cultural 
identity are not actionable unless they can be tied to a specific 
violation of existing law. So, for example, tribal governments have 
a legal right to regulate the use of their tribal name through 
trademark law. As an aspect of their authority, they can license use 
of the tribal name to third parties (as the Seminoles have done) or 
they can prosecute unauthorized uses of the tribal name, as the 
Navajo Nation did with Urban Outfitters.99 Contemporary Native 
                                                   
95 Nell Jessup Newton, Memory and Misrepresentation: Representing Crazy 
Horse in Tribal Court, BORROWED POWER: ESSAYS ON CULTURAL 
APPROPRIATION 195, 201 (Bruce Ziff & Patima V. Rao eds. 1997). 
96 102 CONG. REC. S13, 420 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1992). 
97 Hornell Brewing Co. v. Brady, 819 F. Supp. 1227, 1228 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). 
98 Hornell Brewing Co. v. Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court, 133 F.3d 1087, 1093 
(9th Cir. 1998). 
99 The Seminole Tribe of Florida has authorized Florida State University to 
retain the “Seminoles” Team name. See Robert Andrew Powell, Florida State 
Can Keep its Seminoles, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Aug. 24, 2005), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/24/sports/24mascot.html? 
pagewanted=all&_r=0. The Navajo Nation successfully challenged the use of 
29
Tsosie: Just Governance or Just War?: Native Artists, Cultural Production
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2015
[6:2 2015]        CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 84 
 LAW REVIEW       
 
artists and tribal governments can invoke the provisions of the 
Indian Arts and Crafts Act to prevent non-Indians from falsely 
marketing their goods as “Indian made” or the product of a specific 
Indian tribe.100 Both actions constitute a form of deceptive 
advertising that causes consumer harm.101 Tribal governments do 
not generally retain the exclusive right to produce particular art 
forms, such as rugs or baskets, even if there are distinctive design 
qualities to these traditional arts. So long as the producer of an 
item is, in fact, “Indian” for purposes of the Indian Arts and Crafts 
Act, he or she has the right to freely produce “Indian” art. 
Conversely, so long as a producer of an item correctly labels his or 
her art as “inspired by Native American designs,” he or she may 
freely appropriate Indigenous art forms. Individual Native 
American artists generally have the same rights as any artist to 
obtain protection for their own unique creations under the U.S. 
copyright laws,102 and they have the additional right under the 
                                                                                                                  
the term “Navajo” on Urban Outfitters clothing designs. Navajo Nation v. Urban 
Outfitters, Inc., 935 F.Supp.2d 1147 (D.N.M. 2013); see also Caroline Jamet, 
Urban Outfitters Sued for Trademark Infringement by Navajo Nation, INTELL. 
PROP. BRIEF: AM. U. WASH. C.  L. (June 18, 2012), 
http://www.ipbrief.net/2012/06/18/urban-outfitters-sued-for-trademark-
infringement-by-navajo-nation/.  
100 Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, 25 U.S.C. §§ 305–305e (2012). 
101 False advertising is defined as “[t]he tortious and sometimes criminal act of 
distributing an advertisement that is untrue, deceptive, or misleading; esp. under 
the Lanham Act, an advertising statement that tends to mislead consumers about 
the characteristics, quality, or geographic origin of one’s own or someone else’s 
goods, services, or commercial activity.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 719 (10th 
ed. 2014). 
102 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (listing copyrightable subject matter).  See 
also The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. § 106(a) (expanding 
rights of orators of visual art to include the rights of “attribution” and 
“integrity.”); see Tsosie, Who Controls Native Cultural Heritage, supra note 25 
at 3-5 (discussing conceptual problems within the law that regulates protection 
of Indigenous cultural heritage due to the inability of the law to adequately 
distinguish “objects of art” from “cultural objects”); see also Dr. Jane Anderson, 
“Access and Control of Indigenous Knowledge in Libraries and Archives: 
Ownership and Future Use,” (May 5-7, 2005) at p. 9 (quoting Australian 
Indigenous leader Mick Dodson, who stated that “our laws and customs do not 
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Indian Arts and Crafts Act to label their cultural productions as an 
“Indian product.”103 However, as the next section demonstrates, 
individual artists and tribal governments generally lack the right to 
control the use of traditional cultural expression beyond these 
specific legal categories.104 
IV. CULTURAL PRODUCTION AND THE RIGHTS OF  
NATIVE ARTISTS 
There is a profound conceptual problem at the heart of debates 
about art as a means of cultural production, which is, that “art” is a 
category defined by Western views about the relationship of 
persons to objects, and the categories of legal protection that are 
available to artists are aligned with that conception.105  Western 
philosophy and law worked in tandem to construct the categories 
of “art” and “artifacts” to differentiate the rights of Western 
authors who create works of “art” from those of non-Western 
cultures who produce “artifacts.” Today, individual Native artists 
are actively engaged in cultural production, and there are also 
significant repositories of tribal art and art forms in the archives of 
museums and libraries throughout the nation and the world. 
Indigenous art forms are intergenerational expressions of culture. 
However, because of the continuing conceptual problems that 
relate to the categories of “art” and “artifacts,” as well as what 
merits protection under U.S. copyright or trademark law, there is 
significant confusion about what rights, if any, exist in these 
tangible and intangible expressions of culture.106 
                                                                                                                  
fit easily into the pre-existing categories of the Western system. The legal 
system does not even know precisely what it is in our societies that is in need of 
protection. The existing legal system cannot properly embrace what it cannot 
define and that is what lies at the heart of the problem.”) (emphasis added by 
Anderson). 
103 25 U.S.C. §§ 305–305e. 
104 See Tsosie, Who Controls Native Cultural Heritage, supra note 25. 
105 Id.  
106 See Olivia J. Greer, Using Intellectual Property Laws to Protect Indigenous 
Cultural Property, 22 NYSBA 27 (discussing the inability of U.S. intellectual 
property law to “prevent the unauthorized exploitation of tangible and intangible 
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A. The Historic Framing of Art as Cultural Production 
In contemporary America, “art” is perceived as a commodity in 
the hands of consumers, and creators have limited rights to their 
original expression, which are defined by copyright law.107 Our 
domestic legal system regulates the economic aspects of art as an 
enterprise by offering a limited incentive to creators to produce 
original art for the market. However, ideas are freely exchanged 
and therefore a robust public domain is perceived as necessary to 
serve the public interest in innovation and free expression. 
Traditional Indigenous art forms are largely seen as part of the 
public domain because they are ancient “tribal” cultures and there 
are many “creators” who share this tradition, rather than one 
individual “artist.” In addition, many outsiders see tribal designs as 
“generic” because they are disassociated from their original 
cultural context and the meaning of the symbols is not understood 
by contemporary consumers.108 In other words, the entire 
conception of “art” is defined by the relationship of the 
viewer/consumer to the object, which has been created by the 
artist. This set of relationships is embedded within the Western 
philosophy of aesthetics.109 
                                                                                                                  
indigenous cultural property”); Anderson, Access and Control of Indigenous 
Knowledge in Libraries and Archives, supra note 102 at 33 (concluding that the 
failure of existing law to protect Indigenous cultural knowledge and art forms is 
promoting the institutional development and use of “protocols” which can 
“prescribe modes of conduct through emphasizing or normalizing particular 
forms of cultural engagement”); Kimberly Christen, Opening Archives: 
Respectful Repatriation, 74 AM. ARCHIVIST 185 (2011) (discussing a 
“collaborative archival project aimed at digitally repatriating and reciprocally 
curating cultural heritage materials of the Plateau tribes in the Pacific 
Northwest”). 
107 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). 
108 See Rebecca Tsosie, Who Controls Native Cultural Heritage, supra note 25 at 
5-7 (discussing Native and Western cultural views about “art” and “artifacts”). 
109 See Stephen Davies, Aesthetic Judgments, Artworks and Functional Beauty, 
56 PHIL. Q. 224–41 (2006) (explaining the historic construction of aesthetics and 
the ways in which non-Western cultures were excluded from the framework 
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Within the philosophy of aesthetics that constructed the 
category of art, the individual artist is understood to create a work 
(painting, novel, sculpture, musical arrangement) that evokes a 
specific response from the viewer. According to Western 
philosophers, “aesthetic judgment” in the observer is premised on 
an attitude of “disinterested contemplation,” in which the viewer 
focuses on the item’s intrinsic, non-relational, and immediately 
perceptible properties.110 Thus, the Western concept of art 
encompasses objects and things that are susceptible of aesthetic 
appreciation and the more sophisticated and original the work is, 
the more it is protected by the law as an original work. Original 
authorship is the key to earning rights within the Western 
copyright system. The artist is rewarded with certain rights to 
incentivize his or her creation, and after a specific duration of time, 
the work will fall into the public domain to serve as inspiration for 
other artists.111 
Of course, the philosophy of aesthetics represents a 
distinctively Western experience. Under the philosophy of 
aesthetics, tribal art is generally placed within the category of 
“artifacts,” which is a vast repository of “primitive” and “non-
Western” cultural expression. “Artifacts” are not considered “art” 
even if they contain elements that inspire aesthetic appreciation. 
This is why so much “tribal art” ended up in museums of natural 
history in the nineteenth century, rather than art museums.112 
Western aesthetics also excluded from the cultural category of art 
“phenomena” that lack significant aspects of “human design” and 
appeared to largely reflect “objects of nature” (arrangements of 
shells on a string, for example). To the Western “observer,” tribal 
cultural expression generally falls into the category of “artifacts” 
                                                                                                                  
governing art and the rights of creators); see generally STEPHEN DAVIES, THE 
ARTFUL SPECIES: AESTHETICS, ART, AND EVOLUTION (2012) (discussing the 
possibility of how aesthetics may be partly determined by human biology). 
110 See Stephen Davies, Non-Western Art and Art’s Definition, THEORIES OF ART 
TODAY 199, 201–02 (Noël Carroll ed., 2000). 
111 17 U.S.C. §§ 302–03 (2012) (stating the duration of a copyright in a work). 
112 See Tsosie, Native Nations and Museums, supra note 58, at 7. 
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or “phenomena.” The creator(s) are not considered to have rights 
of authorship, and therefore tribal designs and symbols are freely 
appropriated by others as merely “design” elements.113  
 
Because modern art collectors often trade in “primitive art,” the 
art market must regulate what is the cultural patrimony of nations 
(for example, Mexico claims a national right to pre-Columbian 
art), as well as the private property of museums, which are 
constantly embattled by theft of original works and fraudulent 
reproductions. Native American cultural patrimony is regulated by 
statutes such as the Archaeological Resources Protection Act, 
which protects archaeological resources that are 100 years of age 
or older on federal and tribal lands,114 and the Native American 
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, which criminalizes 
trafficking of tribal cultural patrimony and sacred objects.115 
However, there is no domestic law regulating the intangible 
category of tribal cultural expression. There are countless images 
on the internet that reflect Native American people, including 
individuals in photographs; and tribal symbols, songs, designs, and 
art forms.116 The question is how to regulate the use of these 
images. Who owns tribal images and identities in the modern era?  
 
                                                   
113 See generally Kathy M’Closkey, Up for Grabs: Assessing the Consequences 
of Sustained Appropriations of Navajo Wavers’ Patterns, in NO DEAL!: 
INDIGENOUS ARTS AND THE POLITICS OF POSSESSION 128, 129–132 (Tressa 
Berman ed., 2012) (discussing how the Navajos’ rug market was flooded by 
cheap “knock-off” rugs because the Navajos could not protect their weaving 
patterns under U.S. law). 
114 Archaeological Resources Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa–470mm 
(2012). 
115 Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 
3001–13 (2012). 
116 See Kimberly Christen, Opening Archives supra note 106 at 193 (noting that 
“Digital technologies and the Internet have combined to produce both the 
possibility of greater indigenous access to collections, as well as a new set of 
tensions for communities” who seek to enforce cultural protocols for dealing 
with circulation of those materials). 
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B. Indigenous Perspectives on Art as Cultural Production 
The late Elouise Cobell, a Blackfeet woman who was an 
acclaimed tribal leader, activist, and entrepreneur, said, “Art is the 
greatest asset Indian people have in our communities, yet it is the 
most underdeveloped.”117 A recent study on the economic value of 
art to Native communities found that “an estimated 30% of all 
Native peoples are practicing or potential artists and most live 
below the poverty line.”118 The same study examined the situation 
of emerging Native artists and found that they reported an annual 
household income of less than $10,000.119 Native artists living on 
reservations are largely working through home-based enterprises 
for a cash income.120 They often live hundreds or even thousands 
of miles from the urban art markets. They may lack access to 
electronic markets121 and they may instead rely upon non-Native 
gallery owners and agents to market their work to collectors. 
Clearly, as a group, Native artists lack direct access to a significant 
portion of the market122 Because of their disadvantaged status, they 
are also likely to lack the resources to obtain legal advice on how 
to use existing intellectual property law to protect their rights as 
individual artists. In that sense, Native artists are “underserved” by 
the contemporary legal structure. 
As Ms. Cobell noted, however, cultural expression has always 
been of vital importance to Native peoples.123 Language and art are 
                                                   
117 ARTSPACE, KATHLEEN PICKERING SHERMAN, FIRST PEOPLES FUND, 
LEVERAGING INVS. IN CREATIVITY, NW AREA FOUND., ESTABLISHING A 
CREATIVE ECONOMY: ART AS AN ECONOMIC ENGINE IN NATIVE COMMUNITIES 9 
(Marianna Shay, 2013), available at 
https://www.firstpeoplesfund.org/assets/uploads/documents/document-market-
study.pdf. 
118 Id. at 7. 
119 Id. at 17. 
120 See id. at 8–9. 
121 See id. at 11–12. 
122 See id.   
123 See id at 1. 
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linked to tribal, cultural, and spiritual identity.124 And Native art 
reflects the expression of living cultures, which are linked 
intergenerationally to their ancestors and the generations yet to be 
born.125 Because Native art forms often embody traditional 
practices, including notions of stewardship and appropriate 
transmission of knowledge, it is incumbent upon Native 
communities to have the power to regulate cultural art forms. This 
is the genesis of movements to establish a “cultural trademark” to 
identify authentic Indigenous art and protect against 
misappropriation. For example, the Office of Hawaiian Affairs 
funded a Native Hawaiian Cultural Trademark study, which 
culminated in a 2007 report recommending the use of a cultural 
trademark program to protect the authenticity of Native Hawaiian 
art and the cultural transmission of knowledge that Native 
Hawaiian arts embody.126 The Report documented the many issues 
that arise with any form of cultural certification, but recommended 
a process that would be consistent with Native Hawaiian practices 
of cultural transmission of knowledge and the genealogy of Native 
Hawaiian peoples.127  
The Maori “Toi Iho” Cultural Trademark program in Aotearoa 
(New Zealand) is cited by the authors of this report as a model.128 
The Maori “Toi Iho” Certification Trademark was created by a 
statute passed by the New Zealand parliament “to assist Maori to 
retain control over their cultural heritage and maintain the integrity 
of their art culture in an increasingly commercialized world.”129 
The legislation specified that the Certification Mark would be 
administered through the Arts Council of New Zealand in 
                                                   
124 Id. at 5. 
125 Id. 
126 See HO’OIPO KALAENA’AUAO PA, HALE KU’AI STUDY GRP., NATIVE 
HAWAIIAN CULTURAL TRADEMARK STUDY: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
38–40 (2007), available at 
http://hawaiiantrademarkstudy.com/Media/TrademarkStudyReport.pdf. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 37–43. 
129 Id. at 37. 
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consultation with a parallel Maori arts agency, Te Waka Toi 
Cultural Arts Board.”130 The Maori Arts Board is pivotal to the 
implementation of the program, and the actual Certification Mark 
is premised on the “Iho,” which is the essence of creation and the 
origin of Maori knowledge and tradition, representing the core of 
Maori arts.131 From this core symbol, emanate the “whakapapa” or 
genealogy lines of past, present and future generations, and there 
are colored spires in the design, which represent the creativity, 
innovation, and the dynamism of Maori artists.132 
Through the use of the Maori cultural trademark, the Maori 
people have assumed governing authority over their culture and its 
expression in authentic Maori art that is genealogically and 
culturally tied to Aotearoa.133 This includes the traditional art 
forms of Maori people, which have a rich tradition of transmission 
of knowledge. But, it also includes the modern creations and 
innovations of contemporary Maori artists, who are engaged in a 
process of cultural production that reflects modern cultural 
identity. This is a very powerful example of what could happen for 
Native artists in the United States as a means to exert governance 
authority over Native American cultural production. 
 
                                                   
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 39. 
133 Id. at 39. But see Jessica C. Lai, Maori Culture in the Modern World: Its 
Creation, Appropriation, and Trade 24 (Int’l Commc’ns & Art Law Lucerne, 
Working Paper No. 02, 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1961482 (“On its inception, 
toi iho was considered to be a world-leading initiative, often cited as a model to 
be used by other Indigenous peoples. However, the current National 
Government has decided to cease investment, management, licensing and 
promotion of toi iho. Creative New England stated that market research showed 
that it had not achieved increased sales of Maori art by licensed artists or 
retailers.”); LAW LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, GLOBAL LEGAL RESEARCH CTR., NEW 
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In the United States, inequities extend beyond the level of the 
individual artist to the level of the Indigenous group as a collective. 
Many American Indian and Alaska Native Nations continue to 
possess cultural methods of regulating tribal art forms. However, 
with a few exceptions, the idea of a “cultural trademark” for 
specific Indigenous nations has not received sustained attention. In 
the United States, the Indian Arts and Crafts Act is the only law 
that protects tribal governments and artisans from overt attempts 
by non-Indians to falsely market their goods as “Indian-made.”134 
However, the federal law is designed to avoid consumer confusion 
and not to substantiate tribal claims to cultural identity.135 There 
are 566 federally recognized tribal governments in the United 
States, representing many distinctive cultures and language 
groups.136 But the cultural distinctiveness of American Indian and 
Alaska Native Nations is often not seen. Rather, symbols such as 
the “dream catcher” become part of a generic Indian identity, 
which is widely appropriated by others. As of 2015, there is no 
domestic law in the United States regulating the appropriation of 
intangible tribal cultural heritage. Rather, the discussion of what 
rights Indigenous peoples have to their “traditional cultural 
expressions” is largely taking place in the international arena 
through the agencies of the United Nations and the World 
Intellectual Property Organization.137 
The nation-states possess governing authority within those 
structures and the dominant system of international trade depends 
upon a robust public domain to serve the commercial interests of 
                                                   
134 See 25 U.S.C. § 305a (2012); see also Kelly Mauceri, Note, Of Fakes and 
Frauds: An Analysis of National American Intangible Cultural Property 
Protection, 5 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 263, 268 (2007).  
135 Mauceri, supra note 134. 
136 INDIAN ENTITIES RECOGNIZED AND ELIGIBLE TO RECEIVE SERVICES FROM 
THE UNITED STATES BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, 80 Fed. Reg. 1942 (Jan. 14, 
2015), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-01-14/pdf/2015-
00509.pdf. 
137 Draft Articles, supra note 32. 
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consumers and producers in a global economy.138 Today, 
intangible cultural heritage is increasingly stored in electronic 
databases.139 These archives of “traditional cultural expressions” 
currently lack clear definition of ownership. Does ownership go to 
the person or persons who created the database or archive? Does it 
go to the individuals who produced the recorded expression? Does 
it go to the Indigenous communities these individuals belong to? 
Or are these archives part of the “common heritage of all 
mankind,” an open-access resource and creative commons from 
which others may liberally borrow for their own purposes? 
The policy discussion about cultural production will benefit 
from careful thinking and planning. Indigenous nations should 
develop their own governance for traditional cultural expression 
and should be actively involved in the dialogue about the 
relationship between art and cultural identity. 
V. THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN REGULATING INDIGENOUS 
CULTURAL EXPRESSION 
As this essay has demonstrated, the protection of Indigenous 
cultural heritage in the United States is limited and largely depends 
upon the existence of a federal law, such as NAGPRA or the 
Indian Arts and Crafts Act, which validates specific rights of 
Indigenous peoples, although the underlying right is often 
                                                   
138 See generally INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN INDIGENOUS CULTURAL HERITAGE: 
LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES (CHRISTOPHER B. GRABER, KAROLINA KUPRECHT, & 
JESSICA C. LAI eds., 2012). See also Intergovernmental Committee on 
Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and 
Folklore, Note by the Secretariat: Note on the Meanings of the Term “Public 
Domain” in the Intellectual Property System with Special Reference to the 
Protection of Traditional Knowledge and Traditional Cultural 
Expression/Expressions of Folklore, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/17 (Nov. 24, 2010) 
[hereinafter Intergovernmental Committee on IP] (“Maintaining a rich and 
robust public domain is commonly put forward as an important public policy 
goal.”).   
139 See Anderson, supra note 102, and Christen, supra note 106, and 
accompanying text. 
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grounded upon Indigenous customary law.140  To some extent, 
Indigenous customary law may be incorporated into specific 
federal laws.  For example, under NAGPRA, the very definition of 
categories, such as “sacred objects” and “objects of cultural 
patrimony” depends upon the cultural construction given to a 
particular item by the Native American group under its traditional 
law.141 The federal laws protecting Indigenous cultural heritage are 
exceptional in relation to the general statutory and Constitutional 
laws of the United States, and the fact that they exist at all is 
directly related to the advocacy of Native leaders for redress of 
egregious historical conduct by the United States toward 
Indigenous peoples.142 
 
Traditional cultural expression is not currently regulated by 
U.S. domestic law, and international organizations have struggled 
to define the term in a meaningful way, as illustrated by the 2013 
effort of WIPO to create a draft treaty on the governance of 
traditional cultural expression.143 If the term is defined broadly as 
an expansive “cultural commons” which is not protected by 
existing intellectual property law, then the presumption will be that 
the nation-states control the overarching governance of Indigenous 
cultural expression and have the power to include these groups 
within certain “exceptional” forms of domestic statutory protection 
(such as the Indian Arts and Crafts Act), or exclude them from 
protection, enabling the appropriation of Native cultural expression 
at will by innovative Westerners.  In his role as the U.N. Special 
                                                   
140 See infra note 142 and accompanying text. 
141 See 25 USC section 3001 (3) (C) (defining “sacred objects” with reference to 
traditional Native American religious practices) and (D) (defining “cultural 
patrimony” with reference to the value accorded under Native American cultural 
traditions). 
142 See Senator Daniel K. Inouye, “Repatriation: Forging New Relationships,” 
24 Ariz. St. L. J. 1-3 (1992) (describing the “dark picture of mistreatment” of 
Native American people and their deceased relatives that led to the enactment of 
NAGPRA). 
143 See WIPO treaty, supra note 32; Intergovernmental Committee on IP, supra 
note 32. 
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Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Professor James 
Anaya counseled against such an approach, recommending instead 
that nation-states should recognize Indigenous peoples’ rights to 
traditional knowledge and other aspects of their cultural heritage in 
alignment with the standards of international human rights law.144 
 
In the text that follows, I will sketch out the existing approach 
of international law to traditional cultural expression and compare 
the approach that might be generated under the international 
human rights law relevant to Indigenous peoples.  The choice of 
approaches will likely be informed by the contemporary dialogue 
on cultural production and international trade, and I will draw on 
that dialogue in my discussion, acknowledging that there is no 
global consensus on the outer boundaries of this dynamic. 
 
A. Traditional Cultural Expression 
The effort to create an equitable set of policies for the 
governance of traditional cultural expression has been ongoing for 
several decades. In 1989, UNESCO defined “traditional cultural 
expression” as: 
The totality of tradition-based creations of a cultural 
community, expressed by a group or individuals and 
recognized as reflecting the expectations of a 
community insofar as they reflect its culture and 
social identity; its standards and values are 
transmitted orally, by imitation or by other means. 
Its forms are, among others, language, literature, 
music, dance, games, mythology, rituals, customs, 
handicrafts, architecture and other arts.145  
                                                   
144 See Anaya, supra note 48 at 7. 
145 1 UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORG., Records 
of the General Conference, 25th Session 239 (1989), available at 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0008/000846/084696e.pdf#page=242. 
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In 2005, UNESCO adopted the Convention on the Protection 
and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions with the 
stated objective of encouraging an intercultural dialogue that 
would promote respectful interchange among diverse cultural 
groups.146  The 2005 Convention noted the link between culture 
and development as a common interest of global nations and called 
for an ethic of “partnership” among the nation-states, indicating 
that this would best serve their collective interest in promoting 
productive international trade.  Significantly, this Convention 
upholds the sovereignty of the nation-states to implement the 
measures that they deem necessary to foster the diversity of 
cultural expressions within their territorial boundaries.  Nation-
states are encouraged to be sensitive to the special needs and 
circumstances of particular groups and cultures, while promoting 
an overall ethic of productive collaboration around the use of 
traditional cultural expression. 
 
In the hands of the communities of origin, traditional cultural 
expression is a mechanism to transmit culture across multiple 
generations and to ensure the cultural survival of these cultural 
communities. Therefore, some commentators argue for a strong 
theory of group rights to traditional cultural expression, equivalent 
to standard categories of intellectual property rights, but situated in 
cultural communities rather than particular individuals.147 
However, traditional cultural expression is often contained in the 
databases and archives of museums and libraries, and there are no 
                                                   
146 See Rebecca Tsosie, International Trade in Indigenous Cultural Heritage: An 
Argument for Indigenous Governance of Cultural Property, INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE IN INDIGENOUS CULTURAL HERITAGE: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 
(CHRISTOPHER B. GRABER, KAROLINA KUPRECHT, & JESSICA C. LAI eds., 2012) 
233-34 and footnote 37 (discussing 2005 UNESCO Convention on the 
Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. 2440 UNTS 
311 (adopted on 20 October 2005, entered into force 18 March 2007).  
147 See, e.g., Angela R. Riley, Recovering Collectivity: Group Rights to 
Intellectual Property in Indigenous Communities, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. 
L.J. 175 (2000). 
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uniform policies on governance of these resources.148 Libraries and 
museums play an important role in preserving and providing 
access to cultural heritage throughout the world, and some 
commentators argue against validating cultural rights in the 
communities of origin on the theory that libraries, archives, and 
museums have a duty to safeguard this knowledge as the “common 
heritage of all mankind.”149 Under this view, the purpose of the 
institution is to catalogue and distribute information about global 
cultures and to build repositories of this knowledge, which is 
potentially valuable for many purposes.150 
It is clear that the communities of origin have legitimate 
concerns about facilitating public access to parts of their culture 
and the associated harms that can result from misappropriation and 
misuse of their cultures. These harms are even more likely to occur 
given technological advances, which enable libraries to collect, 
store, preserve, and digitize cultural works, and then transmit those 
digital representations broadly through the Internet where they can 
be downloaded and even modified without any authorization from 
the community of origin. As commentators note, some institutions 
are dealing with these issues on a case-by-case basis, developing 
institutional protocols and best practices to involve Indigenous 
peoples in collaborative management of repositories and archives 
of cultural heritage.151  For example, Kimberly Christen described 
three principles that were vital to a collaborative endeavor 
involving several Indigenous nations from the Plateau region of the 
                                                   
148 Anderson, supra note 102 at 4 (noting that “in most cases, Indigenous people 
are not the legal copyright owners of the material,” which means that they 
cannot control how the material is used and accessed, and further noting that 
much of what they seek to protect “is already in the public domain”). 
149 See, e.g., Amy Hackney Blackwell & Christopher William Blackwell, 
Hijacking Shared Heritage: Cultural Artifacts and Intellectual Property Rights, 
13 CHI. KENT. J. INTELL. PROP. 137, 143 (2013) (arguing for open sharing of 
data from any object or resource that does not fall under the protection of 
intellectual property rights laws). 
150 Id. 
151 See Anderson and Christen, supra notes 102 and 106 and accompanying text. 
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Pacific Northwest.152  The first principle involved developing an 
inclusive approach to institutional holdings that comprised Native 
perspectives on the resources.  The second principle was to respect 
and act on both Native American and Western approaches to 
“caring for archival collections.”153  The third principle was to 
“consult with culturally affiliated community representatives to 
identify those materials that are culturally sensitive and develop 
procedures for access to and use of those materials.”154 
Similarly, experts within the fashion industry are counseling 
designers to work with Indigenous artists and communities to 
ensure respectful collaboration and avoid exploitive forms of 
cultural appropriation.155  This effort also involves a set of best 
practices, including involving Native peoples at the outset of 
“ideation and design processes,” welcoming their “influence and 
control” throughout the production and marketing process, and 
offering “financial or resource-based compensation.”156 In 
addition, cultural outsiders are encouraged to respect the views of 
Indigenous governments, such as the Hopi Tribe, which oppose the 
commercial use of Hopi culture by any outside entity based on 
their belief that cultural knowledge is sacred and that “only certain 
people can have access to certain kinds of information.”157 
At this point, these standards and best practices are considered 
voluntary and optional in many cases, precisely because the 
Indigenous artist or tribal government may not have a recognized 
legal right under existing law.  The expansion of technology and 
global markets offers an additional challenge, as does the 
reconfiguration of contemporary cultures due to the transnational 
migration of peoples and cultures.  
                                                   
152 Christen, supra note 106 at 195-96. 
153 Id. at 195. 
154 Id. at 196. 
155 See Finnerty, supra note 8.at 2F. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. at 3F (discussing comments of Leigh Kuwanwisiwma, who leads the Hopi 
Tribal Cultural Preservation Office). 
44
Cybaris®, Vol. 6, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 3
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/cybaris/vol6/iss2/3




The harms of cultural misappropriation are accentuated in the 
contemporary era by politics of “super-diversity,” which Steven 
Vertovec describes as a mechanism, which shapes national identity 
in the wake of new forms of immigration and transnationalism.158 
As applied to cultural production, super-diversity suggests that 
“culture” and “cultural difference” (diversity) will be used to 
construct, maintain, transform, or undermine national identities 
given the diverse forms of human migration and social 
organization that characterize the modern world.159 Vertovec 
claims that “immigrant cultures are routinely posed as threats to 
national culture,” and therefore issues surrounding migration 
“stimulate, manifest, and reproduce cultural politics.”160  Within 
this matrix, policymakers manipulate “popular notions of national 
versus alien culture” by invoking a notion of “difference” premised 
upon “particular images, narratives, and symbols of national 
culture.”161 
As American identity is transformed through the politics of 
super-diversity, cultural production will increasingly be used to 
sustain a particular national identity. Where will Indigenous 
identity fit within this new politics? It is unclear how the politics of 
super-diversity will affect cultural production. It is possible that 
tribal cultures could be inadvertently associated with foreign 
cultures for purposes of exclusionary laws designed to uphold the 
dominant culture, such as the recent effort of legislators in 
Oklahoma to ban state courts from invoking any “alien” or 
“foreign law,” with a specific reference to Sharia law,162 but 
                                                   
158 Steven Vertovec, The Cultural Politics of Nation and Migration, 40 ANN. 
REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 241 (2011). 
159 Id. 
160 Id. at 242. 
161 Id. at 242; see also Griffith v. Caney Valley Pub. Sch., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
66059 (N.D. Okla. May 20, 2015).  
162 H.R.J. Res. 1056, 52d Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2010), available at 
https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/legislation/52nd/2010/2R/HJ/1056.pdf; see 
also Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012) (affirming issuance of a 
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clearly implicating tribal law systems as well. It is also possible 
that the national governments will further accentuate the 
construction of an “American” culture that draws heavily upon its 
“Indigenous” past, as a way to encompass Native cultures within 
the dominant narrative, in contrast to the “immigrant” cultures of 
Asians and Latinos. Significantly, the media has a prominent role 
in developing “national narratives” and in the construction of 
imagined (national and transnational) communities.163 This is an 
additional reason why media images employing Native stereotypes 
have such a profound influence on the construction of identity. 
I would argue that the project of super-diversity should include 
attention to the political movement of Indigenous self-
determination, which rejects multiculturalism in favor of what 
Professor Duane Champagne terms “multinationalism,” that is the 
construction of a new consensual political order in which 
indigenous peoples are included as sovereign governments and 
treated with equal respect.164 Within this matrix, it is imperative 
that Indigenous peoples have the ability to control their cultural 
identity. The right of self-determination depends upon the ability 
of a people to define themselves autonomously as separate cultural 
groups with distinctive ties to territory, distinctive forms of social 
organization (clans/kinship groups), separate languages, and the 
ability to govern themselves under their own laws and institutions. 
Indigenous political identity will always depend, to some extent, 
upon the group’s ability to use its core cultural identity to 
designate itself as separate from the nation-state and other groups.  
This means that cultural production must be consistent with 
indigenous norms about what is appropriately shared, and what 
                                                                                                                  
preliminary injunction of the state constitutional amendment as there was a 
likelihood of success that the provision would be unconstitutional). 
163 Isabelle Rigoni, Intersectionality and Mediated Cultural Production in a 
Globalized Post-Colonial World, 35 ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUD. 834, 835 
(2012). 
164 Duane Champagne, Rethinking Native Relations with Contemporary Nation 
States, in INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND THE MODERN NATION STATE 3–23 (Duane 
Champagne et al., eds. 2009). 
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must be retained within the group (or even, more narrowly, for 
example by certain clans or societies within the group). 
 
This mode of governance may be a challenge for future 
generations, given the prevalence of many forms of shared cultural 
expression. So, for example, young Native artists have begun to 
explore synergies with hip-hop culture and rap music, as well as 
skateboard culture.165 Professor David Martinez explores the work 
of Doug Miles, an Apache artist and creator of Apache 
Skateboards, who observes that skateboarding absorbs all 
nationalities and cultures, but also encourages Native artists to 
“take back the discourse on their work and redirect the discussion 
away from the mythical pristine lens of the past toward how 
Indigenous artists actually see themselves.”166 Native identity is 
fluid and changing, but also stable and enduring. Native artists and 
tribal governments are engaged in cultural production, just as the 
dominant society is. However, it is necessary to see what their 
respective goals and purposes are, and also understand where the 
conflicts are located. 
 
B. The Human Rights Approach to Indigenous Goverance of 
Cultural Heritage.  
As Professor James Anaya has explained, there are several 
composite norms embedded within the concept of Indigenous self-
determination, including the norm of cultural integrity.167  In my 
prior work, I have argued that the human rights approach should be 
used to reshape the domestic and international law governing 
intangible cultural heritage as it pertains to Indigenous peoples.168  
The U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(UNDRIP) offers the most comprehensive treatment of the norm of 
                                                   
165 See David Martinez, From Off the Rez to Off the Hook! Douglas Miles and 
Apache Skateboards, 37 AM. INDIAN Q. 370, 370 (2013). 
166 Id. at 373. 
167 See Tsosie, International Trade in Indigenous Cultural Heritage, supra note 
146 at 225. 
168 See Id. 
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cultural integrity in its many provisions, and Article 31 specifically 
articulates the right of Indigenous peoples to protect their cultural 
heritage: 
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain, 
control, protect and develop their cultural heritage, 
traditional knowledge and traditional cultural 
expressions, as well as the manifestations of their 
sciences, technologies and cultures, including 
human and genetic resources, seeds, medicine, 
knowledge of the properties of fauna and flora, oral 
traditions, literatures, designs, sports and traditional 
games and visual and performing arts.  They also 
have the right to maintain, control, protect and 
develop their intellectual property over such cultural 
heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional 
cultural expressions. 
In conjunction with indigenous peoples, States 
shall take effective measures to recognize and 
protect the exercise of these rights.169 
As Article 31 recognizes, most Indigenous peoples do not separate 
the tangible and intangible components of their cultural heritage.  
Indigenous knowledge gives meaning to cultural symbols and 
songs, and that meaning must be articulated and governed by 
Indigenous peoples.  Any other outcome would perpetuate the 
forms of “epistemic injustice” that have characterized the process 
of colonization. 
In my view, the right of tribal governments to protect their 
intangible cultural heritage constitutes the core of their inherent 
sovereignty as Indigenous nations.  This “cultural” form of 
sovereignty cannot be limited by the same artificial construction of 
“sovereignty” that informs the characterization of federally-
                                                   
169 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, art. 31, G.A. Res. 61/295, 
Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007).  
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recognized Indian tribes as “domestic dependent governments.”  
This construction emerged out of the Doctrine of Discovery that 
was used to justify European claims to land and sovereignty during 
the colonial era.  It cannot now serve as the basis to appropriate the 
core of Indigenous culture as belonging to the United States or any 
other contemporary nation-state which purports to act on behalf of 
the Indigenous peoples that were subsumed within its borders.   
Rather, as Professor Anaya observes “the same basic arguments 
that have resulted in the rejection of the terra nullius doctrine also 
speak for a reformation of the public domain, as it applies to 
indigenous knowledge.”170  Under this logic, Native people have 
always been the custodians of their traditional knowledge and 
traditional cultural expressions.  They never ceded their 
governance rights and there is no justifiable basis to find that the 
nation-state somehow assumed the right to appropriate these 
aspects of Indigenous identity. 
Thus, the only challenge for contemporary policymakers is to 
recognize how existing jurisdictional limitations constrain the 
ability of Indigenous governments to protect their intangible 
cultural heritage from being misappropriated for commercial gain 
or other uses.  Tribal governments currently have the power to 
enact laws to govern their members and their resources, but they 
may be hampered in their ability to apply this law outside 
reservation boundaries to non-members of the tribe.  This is the 
area where federal law could prove useful, if there is an 
appropriate set of consultations between the United States and 
Indigenous nations, and if there is a way to achieve a political 
consensus about the terms of such protection, which will 
necessarily require modifications of the domestic law. 
At the international level, the nation-states that participate in 
WIPO are differentiating the categories of “traditional knowledge,” 
“traditional cultural expressions,” and “genetic resources” for 
potential action through a multilateral treaty process.  The United 
                                                   
170 Professor Anaya statement, supra note 43 at 5. 
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States is participating in this effort even though it has not 
conducted a formal consultation on this topic with the elected 
leaders of the 566 Federally-recognized Indian tribes, which 
reprises the dynamic of colonial governance.  The political leaders 
of the nation-states view Indigenous traditional knowledge and 
genetic resources as vital to the appropriate development of natural 
resources in an era of climate change.171  For example, the study of 
Indigenous seed stocks and farming practices may promote the 
development of drought-resistant crops by biotech companies 
seeking to patent new products and enable the commercial transfer 
of adaptive technologies to countries likely to suffer from warming 
trends and drought in the years to come.172  Expanding innovation 
in science and technology is the driving force behind the current 
effort to reach global consensus on the use of traditional 
knowledge and genetic resources. 
In comparison, the use of traditional cultural expressions is 
often allocated less importance due to the view that this is related 
to “art,” rather than “science and technology.”  Indigenous 
governments should pay close attention to this effort by the nation-
states to create new categories and hierarchies that replicate the 
same Western cultural assumptions that were used to divest 
Indigenous nations of their lands and cultural resources.  Will 
“traditional cultural expressions” be considered a resource like 
property (or intellectual property)?  Or are they merely ideas, free 
for appropriation by cultural outsiders?  The public benefit 
argument has always been employed by the colonial nations and 
their descendants to justify appropriation from Native peoples.  
This argument continues to be made in the contemporary era in the 
context of a robust public domain.  
                                                   
171 See Rebecca Tsosie, Climate Change, Sustainability, and Globalization: 
Charting the Future of Indigenous Environmental Self-Determination, 4 ENVTL. 
& ENERGY L AND POL’Y J. 188, 250 (2009) (discussing role of Indigenous 
knowledge in sustainability planning). 
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Indigenous peoples must take back the power to define the 
terms of the debate within their own cultural frameworks and argue 
for a form of governance that respects and protects the core of 
Indigenous culture.  This process must begin internally, within 
each Indigenous group, because only tribal law can adequately 
reflect the categories and interests at stake.  Professor Angela Riley 
and Professor Kristen Carpenter describe the process of using 
traditional norms and practices to generate new frameworks of 
tribal law in their article “Indigenous Peoples and the 
Jurisgenerative Moment in Human Rights.”173 Building on their 
insights, I would argue that tribal law on the protection of 
traditional knowledge and cultural expression can be used to 
generate a dialogue with the United States and potentially national 
legislation that adequately protects the interests of tribal 
governments.  With participation from Indigenous governments, 
the United States would be able to engage in a discussion with 
other nation-states about the terms of a multinational convention or 
treaty that would protect Indigenous rights.  Without such 
collaboration, the United States will likely take actions that will 
further impair Indigenous rights. Through an intercultural process 
of dialogue and collaboration among Indigenous peoples and the 
nation-states that encompass them, it may be possible to generate 
new categories of law that can overcome the mythology of 
discovery and effectively protect the rights of indigenous peoples. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
The fundamental challenge for the future is to develop 
equitable governance structures that facilitate respect and 
responsibility for the important values and interests at stake. There 
are likely various potential models of governance, depending upon 
the nature of the community. A “one size fits all” approach to 
protecting the rights of an Indigenous community to traditional 
cultural expression may not be feasible because these communities 
                                                   
173 Kristen A. Carpenter & Angela R. Riley, Indigenous Peoples and the 
Jurisgenerative Moment in Human Rights, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 173, 175 (2014). 
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are not equally situated. For many Indigenous peoples, traditional 
cultural expression is imbued with sacred value and this must be 
acknowledged and respected.174 Within the United States, the 
federal government should engage a consultation with tribal 
governments to assess the possibility of issuing statutory protection 
for tribal “cultural trademarks” as a first step toward protecting 
traditional cultural expression. For American Indian, Alaska 
Native, and Native Hawaiian peoples within the United States, the 
overall issue of governance must be addressed through 
international, domestic, and tribal structures of law and policy. The 
principles of “humanity and justice” should inform the 
contemporary dialogue on cultural production, and tribal 
governments should have an equal voice in creating a workable 
structure for governance of traditional cultural expression. 
                                                   
174 See Finnerty, supra note 8 (quoting the Director of the Hopi Tribal 
Preservation Office who stated that the Hopi have chosen not to trademark their 
designs because they are sacred and must be protected in perpetuity).  
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